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RECENT CASE NOTES
He believed in the "oughtness" of the law.
Many more like these few excerpts from his wisdom might be given,
but these are here set down "in order that we may remember all that buffoons
forget." He did not believe in wild swings of the pendulum because he
once said, "Historic continuity with the past is not a duty, it is only a
necessity." But he did believe that the past is not the present nor the
present the future.
He once wrote to a Hoosier friend of mine, Oswald Ryan, of the
Federal Power Commission:
"Life is a romantic business. It is painting a picture, not doing a sum;
but you have to make the romance. And it will come to the question, How
much fire have you in your belly ?"
As he once said of an associate who had passed on, so we may say
of him:
"Sooner or later the race of men will die, but we demand an external
record. We have it. What we have done is woven forever in the great
vibrating web of the world. The eye that can read the import of its motion
can decipher the story of all our deeds, of all our thoughts. To that eye I
am content to leave the recognition and memory of this great head and
heart."
RECENT CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law--Contract Clause-Emergency Legislation. Thomas,
by garnishment proceedings, impressed a lien upon funds payable to Mrs.
Worthen as beneficiary of a life insurance policy carried by her deceased
husband. Garnishment was taken in satisfaction of a judgment debt upon
a contract between Mrs. Worthen and Thomas. Subsequent to imposition
of the lien, the Arkansas legislature enacted an exemption of money paid
or payable to beneficiaries under insurance policies from seizure through
the judicial process for the amortization of any contract debt. Held, The
statute is unconstitutional as a civil, retroactive law transgressing the consti-
tutional prohibition that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation
of a contract.1
The contract clause was -zonceived as a constitutional subsidy to the
infant credit structure of these United States. It was a permanent protest
against those legislative schemes for the obliteration of debts which issued
from the states during the depressed epoch that followed the War of Inde-
pendence. Both the historical justification presented by Mr. Justice
Marshall 2 and the political argument of the Federalist Papers 3 reveal that,
"The power of changing the relative situation of debtor and creditor, of
interfering with contracts . . . had been used to such an excess by the
state legislatures, as to break in upon the ordinary intercourse of society, and
destroy all confidence between man and man".4 It follows that the social
interest which the contract clause protects is the stability of promises, the
"private faith" and confidence that is credit. No amount of legal sanction,
however, can insure the fulfillment of contractual obligation.
1 W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas (1934), 292 U. S. 426.
2 Sturges v. Crowninshield (1819), 4 Wheat. 122.
3 Madison, Federalist Papers, No. 44.
4 Ogden v. Saunders (1827), 12 Wheat. 213.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Our present day credit structure, burdened by an indebtedness of two
hundred fifty billions of dollars,5 finds little support in its constitutional
guaranty. Serious impairment of security valuations and the inability of
debtors to fulfill their obligations have harassed both debtor and creditor
during this depression. Faced with losing their homes and farms through
foreclosure sales, organized debtors have employed threats of force to
restrict the bidding to nominal sums at these sales. It is not strange, there-
fore, that the stubborn demands of the debtor for relaxed obligations have
found expression in the enactments of many states declaring emergency
moratoria.
With the decision of the celebrated Minnesota mortgage moratorium
case,' upholding the constitutionality of a statute hedged about with protec-
tive assurances to the creditor, there came a judicial recognition that social
interests do exist which are paramount to contract rights. There was the
accompanying limitation, however, that the statute be cautiously drafted
not to exceed the minimum of invasion necessary to sustain that interest.
The Arkansas statute,7 here under investigation, cannot fairly be said to
have limited its operative effect to the ambit of the interest sought to be
protected. By withdrawing the only appropriate remedy of the creditor
in this case, the statute did nothing less than make for legalized repudiation.
Although a change in available remedies which does not diminish the
substantial value of the right is constitutional,8 a denial of remedy has always
brought a judicial interdiction.9 Mr. Justice Marshall, in Sturgess v.
Crowninshield, 10 gave a full expansion to this principle when he said that
contracts are made with a view to satisfaction from future acquisitions.
Therefore, those classes of property subject to the remedial process at the
time of the making of the contract remain subject thereto until the contract,
by some manner, is discharged.
As denial of remedy is unconstitutional, contractual obligations remain
subject only to an exercise of the sovereign residuary power of the state.1
Those decisions sustaining the operation of the police power have often
seized upon Mr. Justice Marshall's presumption, "that the parties contracted
with a view to future acquisitions", twisting it in favor of social control.
They quote the formula that the "contract must be deemed to have been
5Edie, Principles and Problems of Economics, Chapter 25; Fairchild, Furniss
and Buck, Elementary Economics, Vol. 2, Chapt. 38; Gemmill, Contemporary Econ.
Problems, Chapter 21; Garner & Hansen, Principles of Economics, Chapter 31;
Taussig, Principles of Economics, Vol. 2, Chapter 55; Report of a Commission on
Industrial Relations for 1915.
6 Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell (1934), 290 U. S. 398.
7Act 102, Arkansas Laws of 1933.
8 Hill v. Merchants' Insurance Co. (1889), 134 U. S. 515; New Orleans City
& Lake Ry. Co. v. New Orleans (1894), 157 U. S. 219; Red River Valley Bk. v.
Craig (1900), 181 U. S. 548; Wilson v. Standefer (1901), 184 U. S. 399; Oshkosh
Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh (1902), 187 U. S. 437; Waggoner v. Flack (1902), 188
U. S. 595; Bernheimer v. Converse (1906), 206 U. S. 516; Henley v. Myers (1909),
215 U. S. 373.
9 Sturges v. Crowninshield (1819), 4 Wheat. 122; Ogden v. Saunders (1827),
12 Wheat. 213; Bronson v. Kinzie (1843), 1 How. 311; Green v. Biddle (1823),
8 Wheat. 1; Howard v. Bugbee (1860), 24 How. 461; Edwards v. Kearzey (1877),
96 U. S. 595; Barnitz v. Beverly (1896), 163 U. S. 118; Memphis v. United States(1877), 97 U. S. 293; Fisk v..Jefferson Police Jury (1885), 116 U. S. 131; Bradley
v. Lightcap (1903), 195 U. S. 1; Bank of Minden v. Clement (1921), 256 U. S. 126;
Planter's Bk. v. Sharp (1848), 6 How. 301; Gren v. Biddle (1823), 8 Wheat. 1;
McCracken v. Hayward (1844), 2 How. 608; Curran v. State of Ark. (1853), 15
How. 304; Va. Coupon Cases (1884), 114 U. S. 269.
10 (1819), 4 Wheat. 122.
11 Constitution of the United States, 10th Amendment.
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made in contemplation of the regulatoryoauthority of the state". 12 It appears
more in accord with realism to divorce the police power as a method of social
control from fictional presumption that the parties contemplate a measure
of restraint. An honest view brings the simple admission that the state is
privileged to make a reasonable invasion of contractual rights for a proper
objective.' 3
A widening galaxy of interests has served to justify the exercise of this
residuary power. The social interest in public health,14 safety, 15 morals, 16
economic security and progress, 17 social security, 18 and a more or less vague
general welfare' 9 have individually and in union supported legislative inter-
ference with contract rights. In view of estimations that as great as eighty
per cent of those persons leaving estates do so only by way of insurance and
the general knowledge that the income derived from money thus bequeathed
cannot more than provide a subsistence standard in the average case, it is
patent that recognized social interests should be invoked to exempt de-
pendents. The Arkansas statute, however, did not limit the exemption to
dependents; its preamble did not sufficiently identify the social policy; and,
there was no accompanying limitation as to the amount of money insulated.
Furthermore, there was no restriction of operation to the duration of the
emergency which it loosely sought to alleviate. With tactful gesture, the
legislature might well have given the courts a measure of discretion in its
application. The antithesis of this careless type of draftsmanship is found
in the New York Emergency Rent laws and in the Minnesota mortgage
moratorium statute.
In view of these statutory differences it is difficult to accept the inference
of Mr. Justice Sutherland, who spoke for three other justices in his concur-
ring opinion, that the instant decision in effect repudiates emergency legisla-
tion heretofore declared constitutional. Mr. Charles Bunn, in a recent
article,20 has pointed to the paradox that contracts have been impaired by
constitutional legislation but they have been impaired only to save them.
Thus, stay legislation has maintained the security interest of mortgagees
from repudiation by force; and, moratory measures, which have temporarily
impaired the contract right to loans on insurance policies, have saved the
ultimate right of the beneficiary under the insurance contract, thereby
saving insurance as an institution. A complete denial of remedy certainly
12 Sproles v. Binford (1931), 286 U. S. 374; Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v.
Blaisdell (1934), 290 U. S. 398. "Not only are existing laws read into contracts
in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential
attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate for the
legal order."
'3 Manigault v. Springs (1905), 199 U. S. 473; Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v.
Goldsboro (1913), 232 U. S. 48--"Contract and property rights are held subject
to a fair exercise of the police power"; Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter
(1908), 209 U. S. 349-"One whose rights, such as they are, are subject to State
restriction, cannot remove them from the power of the State by making a contract
about them. The contract will carry with it the infirmity of the subject matter."
14 Manigault v. Springs (1905), 199 U. S. 473; Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park
(1878), 97 U. S. 659.
15 Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v. Goldsboro (1913), 232 U. S. 548.
10 Stone v. Miss. (1879), 101 U. S. 814.
17 Sproles v. Binford (1931), 286 U. S. 374; Manigault v. Springs (1905), 199
U. S. 473; Ill. Central Ry. Co. v. Ill. (1892), 146 U. S. 387; Brown Holding Co. v.
Feldman (1920), 256 U. S. 170; Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel (1921), 258 U. S. 242;
Block v. Hirsh (1920), 256 U. S. 135.
Is Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman (1920), 256 U. S. 170; Levy Leasing Co. v.
Siegel (1921), 258 U. S. 242; Block v. Hirsh (1920), 256 U. S. 135.
19 Chicago & Alton Ry. Co. v. Tranbarger (1915), 238 U. S. 67.
20 Bunn, The Impairment of Contracts: Mortgage and Insurance Moratoria (1934),
1 U. of Chicago Law Review 249.
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is not a device to save the institution of credit. Until the credit structure
is in imminent danger of collapse and unless, at that time, the interest in
economic security clearly demands a leveling of debts, it is futile to predict
that economic adjustments will be had under color of denied remedy. A
more equitable distribution of loss would undoubtedly ensue. Yet, after
examining "the judicial pattern" which the modern cases have set out, it
is impossible to speak with positive assurance of the static contract in a
dynamic world.2 1
J. F. T.
Constitutional Law-Indirect Criminal Contempt-Publications. Appel-
lant editor was charged with publishing contemptuous articles relating to
the past appointment by the court of a receiver for a bank. Held, publica-
tions regarding matter which has been finally adjudicated so that carrying
out of the court's judgment cannot be obstructed are not contempt and
cannot be summarily punished unless such publications obstruct, impede, or
interfere with, or embarrass the court in the administration of justice in
future stages of the case.'
Criminal contempts of court embrace all acts committed against the
majesty of the law or the dignity of the court, and the primary purpose of
the punishment of offenders is the vindication of the public authority of
which the court is the embodiment.2 Criminal contempt is to be distin-
guished from civil contempt. The latter is violation of an order or decree
of a court made for the benefit of the opposing party. It is not an offense
so much against the dignity of the court as against the party. 3 Criminal
contempts are classified as either direct or indirect. A contempt is direct
when committed in the presence of the court, or so near to the court as to
interrupt the proceedings thereof; and such contempts are punished in a
summary manner, without evidence, but upon view and personal knowledge
of the presiding judge. That is, contempts of this sort may be punished
by the same judge without a jury trial and without truth as a defense.4
The power of the courts summarily to punish their critics, curbing as it
does the liberty of the press and freedom of speech, has been fruitful of
controversy. However, it would seem that such power in the matter of
direct contempts is clearly reasonable in the light of the necessity for it if
litigation is to continue.5
Contempts are indirect or constructive when they are done, not in the
presence of the-c6urt, but tend by their operation to interrupt, obstruct, or
embarrass the due administration of justice.6 Such contempts may occur
either when there is a case pending or when there is no case pending. A
21 See Willis, The Dartmouth College Case-Then and Now (1934) 19 St
Louis Law Review 183.
1 Nixon v. State (1935), 193 N. E. 591 (Ind.).2 Coons v. State (1922), 191 Ind. 580, 134 N. E. 194; Dale v. State (1926), 198
Ind. 110, 150 N. E. 781.
3 Ex parte Wright (1876), 65 Ind. 504; Anderson v. Indianapolis Drop Forging
Co. (1904), 34 Ind. App. 100, 72 N. E. 277; Denny v. State (1932), 203 Ind. 68Z,
182 N. E. 313.
184 Whittem v. State (1871), 36 Ind. 196. See Coons v. State (1922), 191 Ind.
580, 134 N. E. 194; Mahoney v. State (1904), 33 Ind. App. 655, 72 N. E. 151; Ex
parte Wall (1882), 107 U. S. 265; Ex parte Terry (1888), 128 U. S. 289; (1922)
70 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 331.
5 Hugh E. Willis, "Punishment for Contempt of Court," (1927) 2 Ind.
L J. 309,
I 0 Whittem v. State (1871), 36 Ind. 196; Ex parte Wright (1876), 65 Ind. 504;
Dale v. State (1926), 198 Ind. 110, 150 N. E. 781.
